The Effect of Women’s Intrahousehold Bargaining Power on Child Health Outcomes in Bangladesh by Schmidt, Eleanor M
Undergraduate Economic Review
Volume 9 | Issue 1 Article 4
2012
The Effect of Women’s Intrahousehold Bargaining
Power on Child Health Outcomes in Bangladesh
Eleanor M. Schmidt
Colgate University, eschmidt@colgate.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Ames Library, the Andrew W. Mellon Center for Curricular and Faculty
Development, the Office of the Provost and the Office of the President. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digital Commons @ IWU by
the faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Schmidt, Eleanor M. (2012) "The Effect of Women’s Intrahousehold Bargaining Power on Child Health Outcomes in
Bangladesh," Undergraduate Economic Review: Vol. 9: Iss. 1, Article 4.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol9/iss1/4
The Effect of Women’s Intrahousehold Bargaining Power on Child Health
Outcomes in Bangladesh
Abstract
Trends in developing economies suggest that as relative female intrahousehold bargaining power improves,
consumption preferences favor basic needs which promote child welfare. This study seeks to examine whether
greater household bargaining power by Bangladeshi women is related to an improvement the health of their
children. Results suggest that certain aspects of bargaining power, including female participation in decision-
making about child health care, large household purchases and daily needs, are associated with larger child
height-for-age z-scores. There exists a positive correlation between children in families where their mothers
have decision-making authority and child health outcomes.
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1. INTRODUCTION / MOTIVATION 
 
Although the last three decades have witnessed a 20 percent reduction in 
the proportion of malnourished children in developing countries, about 160 
million children under five years of age—almost one-third of the developing 
world’s children—are still malnourished (WHO 1999; Smith and Haddad 2000). 
One region of the world particularly afflicted with tremendously high malnutrition 
rates is South Asia. The first few years of a child’s life are the most crucial to his 
or her intellectual and physical development, and health indicators function as 
strong predictors of long-term nutritional status and productivity (Smith and 
Haddad 2000). Without proper nutrition in childhood, a person’s potential to rise 
from poverty is weakened due to lost time and lost labor, which result in lost 
income.1  
The nature of gender relations—relations of power between women and 
men—is not easy to grasp in its full complexity. The bargaining power of men 
and women instrumentally shape the resource allocation decisions households 
make, and husbands and wives use their bargaining power to convey priorities in 
allocation. 
This paper studies women’s intrahousehold bargaining power as a tool to 
improve child health outcomes. Relative female decision-making authority in 
households has a demonstrated impact on expenditure allocation and on child 
welfare. Increasing the share of household income controlled by women, either 
through their own earnings or cash transfers, changes spending in ways that 
benefit children (World Bank 2011). There exists an established link in the 
literature between women’s participation in household expenditure decisions and 
an allocation of resources which benefit children (Duflo 2000; Thomas 1990). 
Perhaps this association between improved intrahousehold bargaining power and 
allocation of resources also extends to real health outcomes for children.  
This paper provides insights into the relationship between women’s 
bargaining power and the health outcomes of their children. In this paper, 
bargaining power, the variable of interest, is measured based on the mother’s role 
in making certain household decisions as reported by the child’s mother. Factors 
include decisions about child health care, decisions about purchases for daily 
household needs, and decisions regarding major household purchases.2 The 
dependent variable is child height-for-age, which is considered a long-run 
measure of nutritional status and an adequate proxy to measure a child’s chronic 
                                                 
1
 See section 5 Results/Discussion for a more comprehensive analysis of the impact of height on 
labor market outcomes. 
2
 For a more detailed discussion of the variable of interest, see section 4.2 Bargaining Power.  
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nutritional status.3 The data come from Bangladesh, one of the poorest, most 
densely populated countries in the world. This study has meaningful implications 
for policy and will contribute to the growing literature which finds evidence 
supporting increased female bargaining power as a method to promote equality 
and improve child health outcomes. Bangladesh is a Muslim-majority, patriarchal 
country where women occupy subordinate roles. If women’s taking more 
authority in the decision-making process at the household level in fact contributes 
to a healthier population, then this is worthwhile to study. The policy implications 
suggest targeting women to indirectly address the high incidence of youth 
malnutrition rates in Bangladesh.  
Expanding off the established connection between improved female 
bargaining power and resource allocation, this paper asks if the impact on 
resource allocation translates to actual child health outcomes. Also, the focus of 
this paper is on very young children where the mother is the main caregiver. The 
health of a young child is largely determined by his or her mother’s actions. Is 
there a link to her relative decision-making power at the household level and child 
health outcomes? 
The results suggest that certain aspects of bargaining power, including 
female participation in decision-making about child health care, large household 
purchases and daily needs, are sometimes associated with larger child height-for-
age z-scores. There exists a positive correlation between children in families 
where their mothers have decision-making authority and child health outcomes. 
Additionally, the study reaffirms other important variables which are associated 
with improvements in child health outcomes.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Traditionally, economists and policy makers have tended to view the 
household as a unit which pools income and allocates resources for consumption, 
production, and investments as if it had a single set of preferences. This is called 
the unitary model. There is no discussion of relative male and female bargaining 
power if the household is viewed as a single decision-maker. Only if preferences 
differ systematically between women and men can we observe differences in the 
effects of men's and women's bargaining power on household economic 
outcomes.  However, the literature has well established that the unitary model of 
the household is generally rejected (Thomas 1990; Hoddinott and Haddad 1995). 
Empirical evidence suggests that individuals within households have 
                                                 
3
 For a more detailed discussion of the dependent variable, see section 4.1 Height-for-Age.  
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heterogeneous preferences.  The collective model allows for intrahousehold 
differences in preferences and enables bargaining power to play a role in spending 
decisions.  This study builds on the collective model’s foundation by not treating 
the household as a single economic actor and accounting for individual 
preferences.4 
Within the bargaining approach, intrahousehold interaction is 
characterized as containing elements of both cooperation and conflict. Household 
members cooperate insofar as cooperative arrangements make each of them better 
off than noncooperation. However, there exist outcomes which favor one party at 
the other’s expense, exposing the underlying conflict between those cooperating.  
Which outcome will emerge depends on the relative bargaining power of the 
household members (Agarwal 1997).  
The most common testable hypotheses associated with this model are to 
predict that exogenous sources of income such as non-labor income should be 
spent in the same manner in expenditure decision-making as an extension of the 
collective model.  Thomas (1990) finds that income controlled by the mother has 
a bigger effect on her family’s health than income in the hands of the father.  His 
model is structured so that unearned income is separately measured. The null 
hypothesis states that when income is pooled, the ratio of maternal to paternal 
income effects should be equal.  When household income is pooled and allocated 
to maximize welfare, theoretically income under the jurisdiction of mothers and 
fathers should have the same impact on demand. He finds that it does not; the 
impact of unearned income on child survival was twenty times greater if the 
income was brought in by the mother than if it was brought in by the father. 
Using family nutrition data from Brazil, Thomas (1990) rejects the hypothesis of 
equality of parent income effects. This study reinforces the collective model’s 
assumption that men and women have different preferences (Thomas 1990).   
Quisumbing and Maluccio (2000) explore the unitary versus collective 
models of the household, suggesting that the unitary household model is not a 
good approximation to household behavior. Using assets at marriage as indicators 
of intrahousehold bargaining power, they find that more assets brought to the 
marriage by women relative to men increases education expenditure shares in 
Bangladesh and South Africa (Quisumbing and Maluccio 2000).  
These models embodying the bargaining approach provide a useful 
framework for analyzing gender relations, shedding light on how gender 
                                                 
4 For more general models of household decision-making, see McElroy and Horney (1980); 
Browning and Chiappori (1998). In these collective models, the relative power of household 
members plays a central role in shaping household decisions.  
3
Schmidt: Women’s Intrahousehold Bargaining Power
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2012
asymmetries within a household are structured and modified. The nature of 
gender relations—relations of power between women and men—is not easy to 
grasp in its full complexity. For instance, most models characterize these 
dynamics as a form of "bargaining," but fail to articulate the complex range of 
factors, especially qualitative ones, that might determine bargaining power 
(Agarwal 1997). Agarwal cautions that models and policies could go amiss if 
intrahousehold dynamics are assumed (as they often are) to exist in isolation, 
without examining the extrahousehold socioeconomic and legal institutions within 
which households are embedded. Women's bargaining power within the home is 
clearly associated with their situation outside it. Perhaps developmental policies 
toward improving women’s earning capacity and expanding women’s opportunity 
have to potential to reduce unequal treatment in the household (Agarwal 1997).  
Since women are primary caregivers of children in many cultures, many 
studies of development policies have found supportive evidence of female higher 
decision power translating into better child outcomes. Literature on the Old Age 
Pension (OAP) program in South Africa has shown that children living in 
extended families benefit from the pensions received by their grandmothers. 
Duflo (2000) evaluates the effect of pension transfer on children’s nutritional 
status and finds that the height-for-age z-scores of younger girls are increased by 
1.16 standard deviation units and the weight-for-height z-scores by 1.19 standard 
deviation units. However, the effect is not significant for boys. Duflo (2000) finds 
that the Old Age Pension program had a substantial effect on the nutrition of 
young girls, and the effect was stronger when the pension was received by a 
woman. Duflo (2000) suggests that if improving children's nutrition is a policy 
objective, targeting public transfers to women rather than to men might be 
preferable (Duflo 2000). 
Another example of a program which highlights the importance of income 
in the hands of women is the Mexican PROGRESA program. In this program, 
payments are made to women conditional on their children attending school and 
on their participation in a health care monitoring and food supplementation 
program. The program has been shown to have significant effects on children's 
health, nutrition, and education (Behrman and Skoufias 2006). The findings in the 
literature suggest that policies targeted towards women can generate immediate 
consequences by either improving a women’s voice in the household or 
contributing to an improvement in human capital investments in children. There is 
strong evidence that women tend to shift a larger shares of spending on goods 
which promote child welfare if they are able to control a bigger share of 
household resources (Behrman and Skoufias 2006). 
4
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A few discussion papers sponsored by the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) discuss resource allocation in Bangladesh. Quisumbing 
and Briere (2000) examine how differences in the bargaining power of husband 
and wife affect the distribution of expenditures in Bangladesh, finding further 
support for the hypothesis that increased resources controlled by women are often 
allocated towards children. 
Another IFPRI project brief furthers the study of parental resource control.  
The study suggests that women with more assets, income, or education have 
greater bargaining power in the household because they have more options 
outside of the household.  The bargaining power of men and women 
instrumentally shape the resource allocation decisions households make.  
Husbands and wives use their bargaining power to convey priorities in allocation, 
and the study suggests that improving a woman’s bargaining power and access to 
resources will increase household expenditure on children (IFPRI Project Brief 1, 
2000 and IFPRI Project Brief 3, 2000).  These papers find that both male and 
female asset ownership at marriage is strongly determined by the human capital of 
husband and wife and by the characteristics of their origin families.   
Additionally, an understanding of important causes of malnutrition is 
imperative for the relevance of my model. South Asia is a region plagued by 
chronic youth malnutrition.  Osmani (1997) suggests that variables such as 
women’s status may be key in understanding the prevalence of malnutrition in 
South Asia.  He attempts to explain why South Asia's child malnutrition rate is so 
much higher than Sub-Saharan Africa's, despite almost equal poverty rates, higher 
food availability in South Asia, and comparable levels of public provision of 
health and sanitation services.  The author concludes that particular factors, such 
as the low status of women in South Asia, are important determinants of 
malnutrition and stunted height (Osmani 1997).  
Women’s educational attainment has been connected to child health 
outcomes both directly and as a way to gauge the woman’s autonomy in the 
household. The education level of women, the main caretakers of children in 
Bangladesh, has several potential positive effects on the health of their children. 
Abu-Ghaida and Klasen (2004) find that more educated women are more capable 
of processing information, using health care facilities, and keeping their living 
environment clean. However, women’s relatively lower status in Bangladesh 
restricts their capacity to act in their own and their children’s best interests.  The 
authors indicate women's status relative to men (rather than their absolute status) 
as an important factor, especially for resource control in households. Women are 
more likely to allocate marginal resources to the interests of their children than 
5
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are men; however, the lower their autonomy and control over resources, the less 
able they are to do so (Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman 1997). 
 
3. DATA 
 
The data used in this report is from the 2007 Bangladesh Demographic 
and Health Survey (BDHS), a nationally representative sample survey designed to 
provide an empirical analysis on basic national indicators of social progress. The 
survey focuses on health-related information, including fertility, childhood 
mortality, contraceptive knowledge and use, maternal and child health, nutritional 
status of mothers and children, awareness of AIDS, and domestic violence. Since 
1984, the Demographic and Health Survey program has conducted more than 100 
nationally representative household surveys in more than 50 countries. This 
survey is the fifth in a series of national-level population and health surveys 
conducted in Bangladesh as part of the global Demographic and Health Surveys 
(DHS) program. Data collection took place over a five-month period from March 
24, 2007 to August, 11 2007. Both urban and rural areas were surveyed. 
Despite the many advantages of the Demographic and Health Survey, one 
of its limitations is the absence of an income or expenditure variable, which is 
generally regarded as an important measure of welfare and empowerment. It does, 
however, include a wealth index, a variable which measures relative living 
standards. This allows for some analysis of the effects of wealth on various health 
and nutrition indicators (Hoddinott and Haddad 1995).  
This is a non-experimental study which uses retrospective data about 
decisions mothers make in the household.  This paper focuses on 5,169 children 
under five years of age for whom plausible anthropometric data were available. 
Since this paper is conceptualizing women’s bargaining power in relation to her 
bargaining with her spouse, only those children with both parents’ information 
available in the survey are included. 65% of the households are rural. The average 
number of family members per household is 6.41, while the average number of 
children under 5 per household is 1.34. 49.6% of the children are female, while 
50.4% are male. Over 90% of the households are Muslim.5 See Table 1.1-1.5 for 
a more detailed look at the summary statistics.  
 
4. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
                                                 
5
 Religion is not included as a control in the model as the low variation in respondents’ self-
reported religious affiliation (>90% Muslim) did not meaningfully impact the coefficients on the 
bargaining power variables.  
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 This paper contains four models to specify the relationship between 
mother’s status in the household and child health outcomes. Each model expands 
the scope of consideration for what contributes to child health. Each of these 
models takes the following form: 
 
ChildHealthij = β0 + β1 (BargainingPowerij) +  1 (Xij) + eij 
 
Where Childhealthij is the height-for-age z-score for child i in household j. 
BargainingPowerij is the key variable of interest for the mother of child i in 
household j, represented by three measurements of whether the mother jointly or 
unilaterally participates in making certain household decisions.6  Matrix Xij 
includes all controls and eij captures the idiosyncratic errors. The main focus of 
this paper is on the estimate of β1 and the expectation is that β1 >0. The 
coefficient on BargainingPower, β1, does not represent the causal impact of 
mother’s bargaining power on child health outcomes. This paper solely intends to 
estimate the significant determinants of child health by assessing interesting 
correlations. While we cannot speak to causality in this story, the regression 
results shed light on variables which are associated with positive or negative 
improvements in child health in Bangladesh.   
Model 1 is the most parsimonious model, including only the most basic 
variables pertaining to the child and mother in addition to the key variables of 
interest. In Model 1, Xij includes only child and mother characteristics, including 
if the child is female, the child’s birth order, the mother’s age in years, the 
mother’s educational attainment in years, and the mother’s BMI in Kg/m2.  
Model 2 expands the specifications by including two variables which 
capture some measure of the mother’s participation in economic activity. These 
variables include whether the mother belongs to a microfinance program and 
whether the mother has worked in the past twelve months.  
To Model 2 we add variables to capture factors at the household level 
which vary across households. This is Model 3. In Model 3, Xij includes the 
variables in Model 2 plus controls for household characteristics, such as if the 
head of household is female, if the household is rural, and the wealth index 
variable as a measure of household income. These variables control for household 
level characteristics to account for possible sources of heterogeneity.   
                                                 
6
 For more information on the variables of interest, see section 4.2 Bargaining Power. 
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Finally we add the husband’s characteristics, as perhaps information about 
the husband may drive investments in child health.7 The matrix Xij in Model 4 
includes all of the controls in Model 3 and additionally, variables which assess 
attributes of the husband. These variables include husband’s age in years and 
husband’s educational attainment in years. Because this sample was determined 
by children whose heights were measured and for whom information on both 
parents was available, the sample size remains the same (5,169 observations) in 
the four models. The models include these controls to avoid omitted variables 
bias; they also serve to aid the examination of what contributes to improvements 
in child health outcomes.  
 
4.1 Height-For-Age 
A common measure of malnutrition is the anthropometric status of under-
five-year-old children. Height for age is considered a long-run measure of 
nutritional status and an adequate proxy to measure a child’s chronic nutritional 
status. Height-for-age was selected as the dependent variable for this research 
because of its potential responsiveness to bargaining power in the household. In 
developing countries, human growth deficiencies are caused primarily by two 
preventable factors- inadequate food and infections. Genetic factors become 
important in adolescence, so the height of a young child, given his or her age, 
depends on the accumulated investment in nutrition and healthcare over the 
child’s life (Duflo 2000). Inadequate nutrition in childhood has significant and 
permanent implications for long-term physical development as well as the 
development of cognitive skills. This in turn impacts productivity, which affects 
labor market opportunities and national output (Duflo 2000). 
Low height-for-age, which is called “stunting,” refers to a situation in 
which children are shorter than expected for their age and gender group in the 
reference population due to past chronic nutritional deficiency. Stunting and its 
effects typically become permanent. Most stunting occurs between 6 and 24 
months of age, and stunting after 24 months of age generally reflects the 
interaction of nutrition and infection at earlier ages (Martorell and Habicht 1986). 
Stunted children may never regain the height lost as a result of stunting, and most 
children will never gain the corresponding body weight (Omilola 2010).   
                                                 
7
 The data is not explicit about whether the wife’s current husband is the child’s father. However, 
virtually all women in the sample have been married for more than 5 years to her current spouse. 
We cannot say with certainty that these men are the children’s fathers, but the information on the 
husband corresponds to the male figure who is married to the child’s mother and who has been in 
the household for at least 5 years. There are about 200 women (5%) who have been married more 
than once and of those 200, there are 8 women who have been married for fewer than 5 years.  
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Height-for-age is typically expressed as a z-score. Labeling a child as 
having impaired growth implies some means of comparison with a reference child 
of the same age and gender. The DHS database uses as a basis for comparison 
across countries the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) growth 
reference.  The NCHS reference population consists of a group of well-nourished 
American children and functions as a benchmark. Using standardized z-scores 
enables ease of comparability across different studies (World Health Organization 
1983). Through the use of a standard reference population as a point of 
comparison, z-scores are a statistical measure of the distance from the median 
expressed as a proportion of the standard deviation. 
 
 Z-score =  (Observed value) - (Median value of the reference value)  
(Standard deviation of the reference population)  
 
Relatively short children log negative z-scores while tall children record 
positive z-scores. The commonly used cut-off point to identify severely 
malnourished children is a measurement of 2 SD below the median of the 
reference group (Alderman, Hoogeveen, and Rossi 2005). The mean height-for-
age Z-score for this dataset is -1.54 (SD=1.28), significantly lower than zero, the 
expected value for the reference distribution. This implies that the entire 
distribution has shifted downward, suggesting that a lot of the children have 
inadequate heights for their age. About 20% of the sample includes children with 
stunted growth, which means -2 standard deviations from the mean. See Figure 1 
for the distribution of the dependent variable.  
 
4.2 Bargaining Power 
Bargaining power is difficult to directly quantify. Recent literature on 
intrahousehold resource allocation has focused on several factors that influence 
bargaining power and how households allocate resources. For example, Agarwal 
(1997) writes that relative bargaining power within the household perhaps could 
be revealed in who participates in decision-making and about what. Hence, 
women who participate in decision-making may be said to have greater 
bargaining strength than those excluded from such decision-making altogether.  
The variables of interest in this model are based on the mother’s role in 
making certain household decisions as reported by the child’s mother. The 
questions contained in the survey that are being used to measured women’s 
bargaining power are: 
 
- Who usually makes decisions about child health care? 
9
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- Who usually makes decisions about making purchases for daily household 
needs? 
- Who usually makes decisions about making major household purchases? 
 
No information is provided about what constitutes a major purchase or a daily 
need. As for the types of decision-makers, the survey includes five categories: 
husband decides, wife decides, husband and wife jointly decide, someone else 
decides, and wife and someone else decide. I created three dichotomous variables 
to be used in the estimation equation. The constructed variables in the model take 
a value of one when the woman unilaterally or jointly contributes to the decision-
making process. Together, these variables compose a general measure of the 
mother’s agency in the household.8  
Most households make their purchasing and health care decisions jointly. 
74% of the mothers contribute to decisions about child health care, 61% of the 
women have some say in large purchases, and 67% participate in decisions 
regarding purchases of daily needs. 19% of women make child health care 
decisions unilaterally, 8% unilaterally make decisions about major household 
purchases, and 29% of women unilaterally make decisions about purchases for 
daily household needs. 26% of women in the sample are not involved in decisions 
regarding child health care, 39% the women have no decision-making power 
regarding large purchases, and 33% do not influence decisions about daily needs. 
This suggests that husbands are still dominating the decision making process in 
the household and wives have less power in general. 
 
 
 
Unilateral 
Decisions (%) 
Joint 
Decisions (%) Some Say (%) No Say (%) N 
 Child Health Care
 
19
 
55
 
74..
 
26
 
4224
 
 Large Purchases
 
8
 
53
 
61..
 
39
 
4224
 
 Daily Needs
 
29
 
38
 
67..
 
33
 
4224
 
 
There are a few possible sources of endogeneity in the relationship 
between mother’s power and child outcomes. A mother with high socio-economic 
                                                 
8
 For this paper, the bargaining power variables reflect at least some female contribution in 
household decision-making. Intuitively, a unilateral decision perhaps holds more weight than a 
joint decision; however, equal weighting has been given to both unilateral and joint decisions to 
avoid assigning arbitrary importance. Including a joint decision as some measure of participation 
is perhaps a weaker measure, yet it allows for a broader definition of bargaining power. Results 
for unilateral bargaining power are not included.  
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status tends to be more powerful in family bargaining, and she may be more likely 
to invest in child human capital. Although some observable characteristics can be 
controlled for in the regression, estimates are still biased with unobservable 
characteristics. For instance, a well-endowed woman can bring more resources to 
the marriage through her high level of social capital and an outside social 
network, which may simultaneously enhance her power and her capacity to invest 
more in her children (Quisumbing and de la Briere 2000).  
Social norms and custom-based gender discrimination in Bangladesh are 
another potential cause of endogeneity. In societies with patrilineal kinship and 
inheritance, women are limited to the domestic sphere with less bargaining 
power. Additionally, these areas tend to have stronger son preference and allocate 
more resources to sons. This may impact relative investments in child health, and 
this cultural preference may impact the models’ estimates. Ideally, the model 
would look to identify sources of women’s bargaining power which vary 
exogenously, such as assets at marriage or non-labor income; however, no such 
variable is available nor included in the model. This hypothetical variable which 
captures the mother’s unobservable endowments that she brings into the marriage 
could perhaps more fully capture her bargaining power.  
 
4.3 Maternal Education 
Models of child health production emphasize the importance of the 
mother’s education as well as her bargaining power. Greater education increases 
her health knowledge which improves her ability to promote the health of her 
children (World Bank 1993), and greater bargaining power increases her say over 
household resources which often leads to greater allocations to child health and 
nutrition, compared to their husbands. Because maternal education affects 
children's survival probability, the sample of living children over-represents 
children of educated mothers. Consequently, the effect of maternal education is 
likely to be slightly underestimated (Desai and Alva 1998). The results presented 
in this paper are not weighted to account for this underestimation. Educational 
attainment in the model is measured in years. The average educational attainment 
for mothers in the sample is 5.12 years (SD= 4.39). 25% have no education, 21% 
have incomplete primary education, 10% completed primary school, 28% have 
incomplete secondary education, 7% completed secondary school, and 9% have a 
higher educational background.9  
                                                 
9
 In this study, maternal education functions as a control variable. Using dummy variables to 
represent various educational achievements (e.g., complete primary school, complete secondary 
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 4.4 Wealth Index 
Another important control in the model is the wealth index. The 
association between socioeconomic status and health status has been highly 
studied (Thomas 1994; Razzaque 2011). Rutstein and Johnson (2004) find that 
chronic child malnutrition as measured by the percent stunted among children 
under five years is also highly variable by wealth, with the level of stunting for 
the lowest quintile being almost nine times the level for the highest quintile in 
Peru.  
For many economists, household income is the theoretical indicator of 
choice. However, it is extremely difficult to measure accurately in developing 
countries for a number of reasons—mainly because people do not know their 
income or only know it in broad ranges, earnings vary daily, weekly, or 
seasonally, and an earner may have several sources of income at one time.10 In the 
DHS survey data, the wealth index is a composite measure of a household's 
cumulative living standard. As a measure of economic status, wealth has several 
advantages. It represents a more permanent status than does either income or 
consumption. Also, in the DHS questionnaires, wealth is more easily measured 
(with only a single respondent needed in most cases) and requires far fewer 
questions than either consumption expenditures or income.  
The wealth index is calculated using data on a household’s ownership of 
selected assets, such as televisions and bicycles, materials used for housing, types 
of water access and sanitation facilities, and other characteristics that are related 
to wealth status. The wealth index places individual households on a continuous 
scale of relative wealth. DHS categorizes all interviewed households into five 
wealth quintiles to compare the influence of wealth on various health and 
nutrition indicators.11 The wealth index allows for the isolation of problems 
particular to the poor, such as unequal access to health care, as well as those 
which pertain to the wealthy. The wealth index is particularly essential for this 
research, as the DHS data lacks detailed information about earnings and income.  
The wealth index enables the model to control for the extent to which household 
economic status affects child health outcomes. There are 4,145 households in the 
sample. About 19% are categorized as poorest, 20% fall into the poorer category, 
                                                                                                                                     
school) was considered, but the coefficients on bargaining power were not affected so years of 
education as a continuous variable is utilized here.  
10
 For more information, see Rutstein and Johnson (2004). 
11
 http://www.measuredhs.com/topics/Wealth-Index.cfm 
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19% are classified as middle, 19% are grouped as richer, and 23% are labeled as 
richest. By construction, each quintile has about 20% of the households.   
 
4.5 Working 
Women’s participation in economic activities has been studied as a 
pathway to increased empowerment and raised status in the household as an 
earner. In Bangladesh, however, as in many patriarchal societies, there is 
substantial under-reporting of women’s economic activity (Mahmud and Tasneem 
2011). Non-recognition of women’s economic activity not only leads to 
undervaluation of women’s economic contribution but also contributes to their 
lower status in society relative to men. The types of work women are involved in 
are often overlooked by women themselves (Mahmud and Tasneem 2011). Sen 
(1990) argues that women who earn cash have more bargaining power than those 
who are solely housewives, because of, among other things, the cultural 
devaluation of housework. Women's entry into wage labor could thus be one way 
of increasing their intrahousehold bargaining power not just directly, but 
indirectly, by increasing the perceived legitimacy of their claims. 1,128 women in 
the sample (27%) have worked in the past 12 months, and 84.5% of working 
women are paid in cash or in cash and in kind. Becker (1981) suggests that 
women’s employment or raise in economic share in the family may increase 
allocation to household resources to them but may not necessarily upgrade their 
decision-making power.  
 
4.6 Body Mass Index 
This paper uses body mass index (BMI) to capture the mother’s health 
status. BMI, which is also known as Quetelet’s Index, is defined as weight in 
kilograms divided by the square of height in meters. Unlike the nutritional status 
of children, the evaluation of nutritional status of women does not require a 
reference table from a well-nourished population. The BMI of well-nourished 
adult women ranges from 18.5 to 25.0. A BMI higher than 25.0 indicates obesity 
or what is sometimes called over-nutrition. A BMI lower than 18.5 is considered 
to be an indicator of energy deficiency or low food intake, which can be used to 
assess malnutrition (Omilola 2010). There are important reasons why mother’s 
BMI has been included as a control variable. The nutritional status of women can 
have serious consequences for their children’s birth weights and for infant 
mortality (Omilola 2010). The literature has well-documented that the BMI of an 
adult can serve as a good proxy for current nutritional status (Sen 1990; Strauss 
and Thomas 1998). The average mother’s BMI in this sample is 20.43 (SD= 
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3.35). The mother’s BMI in the data is measured at the time of the survey, not at 
the time of her children’s birth. While an imperfect measure, it crudely captures 
the mother’s health status and controls for the effects of the mother’s health on 
child health (under the assumption that BMI should not drastically change over 
the 5 year period).  
 
4.7 Microfinance 
Women’s participation in microfinance programs has been viewed as an 
important channel for increasing women’s subordinate status within the 
household. The literature suggests that participation in microfinance programs 
improves women’s empowerment and intrahousehold bargaining power. Similar 
to the working variable which captures the mother’s formal work experience, 
microfinance participation aims to capture another facet of women’s participation 
in the market. The microfinance variable is a dichotomous variable which takes 
the value one if the mother belongs to at least one microfinance program. The 
programs include Grameen, BRAC, Asha, Proshika, and BRBD. 28% of the 
women in the sample belong to at least one microfinance program. 
 
5. RESULTS / DISCUSSION 
 
Table 2 presents the OLS regression estimates which analyze the effect of 
women’s decision-making status on their children’s health. There exists a positive 
correlation between children in families where their mothers have decision-
making authority and height-for-age ratios. The coefficient on the bargaining 
power variable which captures whether the mother participates in decisions about 
large purchases is consistently significant at the 1% level and positively correlated 
with child health outcomes. As the variables of interest are dichotomous, their 
interpretation is a description of contrasts of one category relative to another. In 
Model 1, the coefficient implies that children with mothers who participate in 
making large household purchases are on average 0.118 standard deviation units 
taller than children whose mothers do not participate, ceteris paribus. As more 
control variables are added, the coefficient on the variable describing participating 
in decisions about large purchases does not vary substantially in magnitude. There 
is little to no evidence, however, for a relationship between child health and other 
female bargaining power variables. In Model 1, whether a mother makes 
decisions about daily needs is significant at the 10% level. This variable loses its 
explanatory power as more specifications are added to the model. The effect of 
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whether the mother makes decisions regarding child health care is small and not 
significant.  
Overall, the findings from these models are consistent with the literature. 
Mother's education, a continuous variable measured in years, is positively related 
to height-for-age ratios. For every additional year of mother's education, we can 
expect child height to increase on average by 0.091 standard deviations, holding 
all other regressors constant. Also, mother’s BMI is consistently statistically 
significant across the models and also positively associated with child health. In 
Model 1, on average, female children are 0.085 standard deviations shorter than 
their male counterparts. This is significant at the 5% level. As more variables are 
included, the coefficient capturing the relative disadvantage of female children 
slightly decreases in magnitude. In Model 4, for example, the coefficient tells us 
that on average, female children are 0.077 standard deviations shorter than their 
male counterparts, holding all else constant. Being a rural child also is associated 
with lower height-for-age z-scores, although this effect is not statistically 
significant.  
The coefficients on the wealth index are all negatively correlated with the 
dependent variable with respect to the highest wealth quintile. The wealthiest 
quintile is the reference group, as using this category best exploits and most 
clearly demonstrates the negative relationship between wealth status and health 
outcomes. The coefficient magnitudes decrease as living standards rise, which is 
consistent with the literature. They are all highly statistically significant, 
suggesting the strong relationship between income and child health outcomes. 
When variables measuring attributes of the child’s father are added in Model 4, 
the impact of wealth on child health decreases. We still see the wealth index as 
highly statistically and economically significant, yet the magnitudes of the 
coefficients of each quintile relative to the richest quintile decrease in absolute 
value.  For example, in Model 3, the coefficient on the wealth index of children 
from the poorest households tells us that on average, these children are 0.41 
standard deviations shorter than their counterparts in the wealthiest quintile, 
holding everything else constant. In Model 4, the coefficient on children from 
households designated poorest reads that on average, children from the poorest 
households are 0.13 standard deviations shorter than their counterparts from the 
richest families, holding everything else constant.  
Wealth (the proxy for income) matters less once we take husband’s 
education into account. Perhaps this is because husband’s education is in some 
way measuring his labor market outcomes, and therefore captures some of the 
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explanatory power of the wealth index. The significance of the mother’s 
education on child health outcomes falls in magnitude once add husband’s 
characteristics to the model, especially the variable which captures the husband’s 
years of education.  This suggests the importance of parental education. 
Definitely the women’s education matters as it remains significant at the 1% 
level, but when the model controls for husband’s education, the coefficient on the 
women’s education reduces in magnitude. 
Interestingly, the microfinance variable is negatively associated with the 
dependent variable and is consistently statistically significant at the 1% level 
across the four models. The negative correlation between microfinance 
participation and child health outcomes is surprising. The literature and empirical 
evidence suggests that participation in microfinance schemes increases women’s 
intrahousehold agency by providing a source of income and increasing exposure 
to outside social networks. Women’s participation in microfinance programs has 
been viewed as an important channel for increasing women’s subordinate status 
within the household. In Model 3, before controlling for household wealth, this 
negative correlation may be explained by the fact that the poorest households 
have the highest likelihood of eligibility for participation in microfinance 
programs. In the bottom quintile, 36% of the children have mothers in a 
microfinance program. In the 2nd quintile, 33% of children do. In the 3rd quintile, 
31% do, in the 4th, 26% do, and in the top wealth quintile, only 14% of children 
have mothers in a microfinance program. The trend suggests that participation in 
microfinance programs is negatively correlated with accumulated assets. While 
this initially seems counter-intuitive, in light of the strong wealth story to explain 
child health outcomes, the sign on microfinance becomes a little more 
understandable. However, the variable continues to be negatively significant after 
controlling for wealth.  
Perhaps trends in the literature are not so straight-forward. Microfinance 
promotes income-generating activities and microenterprises. The beneficiaries use 
the loan to supplement an ongoing source of income. Perhaps this practice has 
adverse effects on child health as microfinance participation diverts the mother’s 
time from household activities. The children in the sample are very young, so 
perhaps microfinance exposes the underlying tension between the mother’s 
reproductive and productive roles. Women’s participation in microfinance 
programs may increase her status in the household; however, there is little 
correlation with her relative bargaining power and microfinance membership. 
Low levels of investment in child health therefore have far-reaching 
consequences for economic growth, distribution, and welfare. Case and Paxson 
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(2008) examine the impact of height on labor market outcomes. They find that 
height is positively associated with cognitive ability, which is rewarded in the 
labor market by higher average earnings. Using data from the USA and UK, Case 
and Paxson find that the association between height and earnings is economically 
significant. For both men and women, the relationship is striking: a one-inch 
increase in height is associated on average with a 1.4 percent to 2.9 percent 
increase in weekly earnings, and a 1.0 percent to 2.3 percent increase in average 
hourly earnings. Their results also indicate that an increase in US men’s heights 
from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the height distribution—an increase of four 
inches—is associated with an increase in earnings of 9.2 percent. Although men 
earn more than women at all heights, the increase in earnings with height is 
similar for men and women (Case and Paxson 2008). These trends also exist in 
developing countries. Vogl (2001) looks at labor market outcomes in Mexico and 
finds that height bestows advantages in cognitive skill, education, health, and 
earnings. His results imply that a one centimeter increase in height leads to wage 
gains of 2.1 percent and 2.9 percent for men and women, respectively (Vogl 
2011). These numbers help to conceptualize the long-term returns to health. The 
literature examines the importance of height as it pertains to long-run productivity 
and wages, demonstrating the importance of investment in child health.  
 
5.1 Heterogeneous Effects 
The current sample includes all children aged 0-59 months old in both 
urban and rural areas. An interesting question is whether the empirical findings 
hold for subsamples such as urban vs. rural, girls vs. boys, infants (<12 months) 
vs. non-infants. Tables 3 shows regression results for interactions of the 
bargaining power variables and certain sub-populations under the hypothesis that 
the relationship between bargaining power and child health outcomes varies by 
certain conditions, namely age of the child, geographical location, and gender of 
the child. If children in the different groups are somehow systematically different 
from their counterparts, it makes sense to run these interaction models. By 
incorporating dummy variables for group membership and interaction terms for 
group membership with the bargaining power variables, we can better identify 
what effects, if any, differ across groups. Because mother’s participation in 
decisions regarding large purchases is consistently significant and robust 
throughout Model 1-4, only this measure of female bargaining power is used in 
the interaction results. Using one decision-making variable to generally represent 
relative power allows for a clearer, more digestible analysis.  
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Employing interaction terms was selected as the preferred method to 
examine different effects within groups. Sample selections issues may have been 
introduced running regressions with sub-populations. For example, there may be 
something particular and unobservable about the type of parents who have 
allowed a girl child to survive. Interaction terms control for if female children are 
systematically neglected. Likewise, there may be something unique and 
unobservable about parents whose infant child survives past infancy. We do not 
know the composition of natives and immigrants, especially in urban areas, so 
running just a rural or urban sample invites sample selection concerns also. The 
interaction terms indicate the difference in mother’s bargaining power effects 
between groups (infant and non-infant, female children and male children, urban 
and rural) yet preserve the sample size.  
Table 3 shows the results of the regression including the bargaining power 
variable associated with large purchases interacted with the infant dummy, female 
child dummy, and rural dummy relative to the baseline model (Model 4 of Table 
2). Column two of Table 3 displays the regression of the interaction of the 
variable of interest with the infant dummy. The t-value on infant is highly 
significant implying that the intercepts do differ. For both infants and non-infants, 
mother’s participation in decision-making is associated with an increase in height-
for-age z-scores. The results submit that, for infants and non-infants with equal 
levels of material bargaining power, there is no additional advantage for infants if 
mothers participate in household decisions about large purchases.   
Columns three and four in Table 3 indicate that there are not substantial 
differences in child health outcomes between genders with respect to maternal 
bargaining power and geographical location with respect to maternal bargaining 
power. The partial effect of height-for-age z-scores with respect to the interaction 
dummies does not depend on the magnitude of the bargaining power variables. 
None of the bargaining power variables nor the interaction terms is statistically 
significant in these models. Bargaining power is not related to child health in a 
different way when examining subgroups. Being female or being an infant or 
being rural matters in the expected way; however, given that, mother’s decision-
making authority has no impact vis-à-vis male or non-infants or urban children.  
 
5.2 Fixed Effects  
The fixed effects model changes the nature of the hypothesized question 
by asking how bargaining power affects child health in households encompassing 
joint families. A fixed effects model controls for household-level unobservables. 
It is possible that omitted family-level variables, including attitudes about women 
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and women’s agency, are correlated with regressors, and thus their estimated 
effects on child health outcomes may be biased.  
A unique feature of households in South Asia which can be exploited with 
a fixed effects model is the phenomenon of multi-generational families. A 
household could be composed of multiple nuclear families all led by the same 
head of household figure. Within this special subset of households with joint 
families, the fixed effects model allows us to ask if is there differences in child 
health outcomes with respect to the mother’s bargaining power when male 
attitudes about women are held constant. Of course in joint families, measuring 
bargaining becomes much more complicated, as there are not just two adult 
interests competing. 
Table 4 shows the results of the fixed effect regression. In the sample, 
there are 256 households with more than one mother present. The variation in the 
fixed effects model comes from these households. All household-level variables 
are dropped from the model. When the model controls for household-level 
features, the magnitude of the coefficient on women making decisions about child 
health care grows substantially larger and becomes statistically significant at the 
10% level. Whether the mother participates in large purchase decisions loses its 
significance. The disadvantage of being a female child falls once household level 
effects are controlled for and becomes not significant. Interestingly, mother’s age 
becomes highly negatively significant. Mother’s education and father’s education 
are no longer significant, despite their consistent significance in the other models. 
Also, whether the child’s mother participates in a microfinance program loses its 
statistical significance.  
These results demonstrate that what determines child health in multi-
generational families is more complicated. Cooperation and conflict models 
require more nuance. There are more resources in joint families which mothers in 
nuclear families do not have access to. Fewer mothers in joint families participate 
in microfinance programs. These households are wealthier and there are more 
working males under one roof. The need to borrow funds or take loans decreases 
as there are multiple sources of income within the household already. Also, there 
are more mothers present to care for children. A mother’s time away from the 
household participating in microfinance programs may not have as severe an 
impact her child’s health thanks to the presence of other mothers, grandparents, or 
other female figures. Why age becomes negatively significant is an interesting 
question. A more in-depth study of the household structure of joint families may 
prove to provide an answer. Are older or younger mothers responsible for taking 
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care of the children? In multi-generational families, young mothers have to 
contend with mother-in-laws and more senior female figures. It is unclear what 
the mechanism is, but within a household as the mother’s age increases, the 
child’s height-for-age ratio decreases. A complete analysis of the interesting 
dynamics of joint households’ structure is limited by the data. There is a need for 
future exploration of women’s roles within joint families and specifically joint 
families in Bangladesh.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper assumes a collective model of household bargaining to address 
the association between women’s decision power and child health outcomes. The 
theoretical foundation predicts that when mothers have stronger preference for 
child quality than fathers, an increase in mother’s bargaining power can benefit 
the child. This paper tests the theory’s implications using 2007 household data 
from Bangladesh. The empirical evidence is consistent with the theory: women 
who enjoy decision-making power in the household, especially regarding large 
purchases, are associated with having children with better height-for-age ratios. 
Both theoretical prediction and empirical findings submit the importance of 
raising female intrahousehold power. This is particularly relevant for the 
developing countries where there is persistent gender inequality in the household.  
This paper contributes to the body of literature discussing the importance 
of women’s agency in households in relation to children’s health, given the 
established link between women’s control of household resources and 
consumption preferences favoring basic needs which promote child welfare. 
Women's empowerment and the promotion of gender equality are key ingredients 
to achieving sustainable development. Women’s inequality as it translates to 
intrahousehold bargaining power affects child welfare, including rates of chronic 
malnutrition.  Enhancing women’s status leads to more investment in their 
children’s education, health, and overall wellbeing. This study contributes to the 
existing literature on the subject because the effect of mother’s participation in 
expenditure decisions as it relates to child malnutrition prevalence in Bangladesh 
is an area which has not been fully explored. If measures suggesting that 
increased rates of women’s bargaining power do in fact improve children’s health 
levels, then this is an important and relevant conclusion to consider when 
constructing policy to target the poor.   
This study provides interesting fodder and an exciting opportunity for 
future study. This study’s ability to capture the robust and complex nature of 
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intrahousehold bargaining power was limited by the data. In future studies about 
bargaining power and child health, perhaps more sophisticated panel data could 
better capture the dynamic nature of bargaining power. Additionally, an 
exogenous source of bargaining power such as non-labor income or assets at 
marriage could prove noteworthy. Also, it is important to examine the 
extrahousehold socioeconomic and legal institutions within which households are 
embedded, as women's bargaining power within the home is clearly associated 
with their situation outside it. 
Various economic and social development indicators show that in the last 
20 years, Bangladesh, a poor, Muslim-majority, patriarchal country, has made 
substantial progress towards gender equality. As Bangladesh turns 40, 
improvements in women’s wellbeing and increased agency may be some of the 
most significant gains in the post-independence era.  
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Figure 1 
 
The dependent variable, height-for-age z-scores, is normally distributed around mean -1.54. 
 
Table 1.1 Child Summary Statistics 
Children's Characteristics Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs. 
Height-for-Age (z-score) -1.54 1.28 -5.84 4.35 5169 
Child Age (months) 29.50 17.02 0 59 5169 
Child Height (cms) 82.37 12.86 49 116.8 5169 
Proportion of Female Children 0.50 0.50 0 1 5169 
Proportion of Infants 0.20 0.40 0 1 5169 
 
Table 1.2 Mother Summary Statistics 
Mothers' Characteristics Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs. 
Age (yrs) 25.96 6.32 15 49 4224 
Education (yrs) 5.12 4.39 0 17 4224 
BMI (kg/m2) 20.43 3.35 12.31 42.7 4224 
Proportion Belonging to a Microfinance 
program 0.28 0.45 0 1 4224 
Proportion Working 0.27 0.44 0 1 4224 
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Table 1.3 Female Bargaining Power Summary Statistics  
Bargaining Power  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs. 
Proportion that Participates in Decisions 
re. Child Health Care 0.74 0.44 0 1 4224 
Proportion that Participates in Decisions 
re. Large Purchases 0.61 0.49 0 1 4224 
Proportion that Participates in Decisions 
re. Daily Needs 0.67 0.47 0 1 4224 
 
Table 1.4 Household Summary Statistics 
Household Characteristics Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs. 
Proportion Rural 0.65 0.48 0 1 3968 
Proportion with Female Heads 0.09 0.28 0 1 3968 
Wealth Index (1-5 scale) 3.05 1.44 1 5 3968 
 
Table 1.5 Husband Summary Statistics 
Husbands' Characteristics  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs. 
Age (yrs) 35.11 7.88 18 75 4224 
Education (yrs) 5.12 4.94 0 17 4224 
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For all models: Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%;  
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Models include child's birth order. 
 
Table 2 OLS Regression Results 
Height to Age Z-Score Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Participates in Decisions re. 
Child Health Care 
0 0.002 0.007 0.014 
[0.046] [0.046] [0.046] [0.046] 
Participates in Decisions re. 
Large Purchases 
0.118 0.116 0.114 0.118 
[0.043]*** [0.043]*** [0.043]*** [0.043]*** 
Participates in Decisions re. 
Daily Needs 
0.078 0.07 0.073 0.067 
[0.046]* [0.046] [0.045] [0.045] 
Female Child -0.085 -0.084 -0.079 -0.077 [0.034]** [0.034]** [0.034]** [0.034]** 
Mother's  
Age 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.009 
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] 
Mother's Years of 
Education 
0.091 0.09 0.082 0.073 
[0.020]*** [0.020]*** [0.020]*** [0.020]*** 
Educ*Age  
Interaction 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]* [0.001]** 
Mother's BMI 0.055 0.054 0.041 0.039 [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
Mother in Microfinance   -0.138 -0.11 -0.101 
  [0.039]*** [0.039]*** [0.039]** 
Mother Working   0.001 0.02 0.025 
  [0.040] [0.041] [0.040] 
Female Head  
of Household 
    0.047 0.039 
    [0.064] [0.064] 
Rural   
 
-0.055 -0.063 
  
 
[0.041] [0.041] 
1st Wealth  
Quintile 
    -0.407 -0.313 
    [0.069]*** [0.071]*** 
2nd Wealth  
Quintile 
  
 
-0.319 -0.233 
  
 
[0.063]*** [0.065]*** 
3rd Wealth 
Quintile 
    -0.246 -0.185 
    [0.062]*** [0.062]*** 
4th Wealth  
Quintile 
  
 
-0.23 -0.19 
  
 
[0.055]*** [0.055]*** 
Husband's  
Age 
      0.003 
      [0.004] 
Husband's Years of 
Education 
      0.028 
      [0.005]*** 
Observations 5169 5169 5169 5169 
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.1 0.11 
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Table 3 Interaction Regression Results 
Height to Age Z-Score Base Model Infant  Interactions 
Female  
Interactions 
Rural  
Interactions 
Participates in Decisions 
re. Child Health Care 
0.014 0.002 0.013 0.014 
[0.046] [0.043] [0.046] [0.045] 
Participates in Decisions 
re. Large Purchases 
0.118 0.121 0.065 0.080 
[0.043]*** [0.044]** [0.053] [0.062] 
Participates in Decisions 
re. Daily Needs 
0.067 0.057 0.066 -0.068 
[0.045] [0.043] [0.045] [0.0454] 
Large Purchases  
Interaction 
  0.082 0.106 0.058 
  [0.101] [0.069] [0.072] 
Female Child -0.077 -0.079 -0.141 -0.077 [0.034]** [0.032]** [0.054]** [0.034]** 
Mother's  
Age 
-0.009 0.004 -0.009 -0.009 
[0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] 
Mother's Years of 
Education 
0.073 0.061 0.073 0.073 
[0.020]*** [0.020]*** [0.020]*** [0.020]*** 
Educ*Age  
Interaction 
-0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
[0.001]** [0.001]* [0.001]** [0.001]** 
Mother's BMI 0.039 0.038 0.039 0.039 [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
Mother in Microfinance -0.101 -0.053 -0.101 -0.100 [0.039]** [0.038] [0.039]** [0.039]** 
Mother Working 0.025 0.049 0.025 0.024 [0.040] [0.039] [0.040] [0.041] 
Female Head  
of Household 
0.039 -0.001 0.036 0.038 
[0.064] [0.061] [0.064] [0.064] 
Rural -0.063 -0.056 -0.065 -0.066 [0.041] [0.039] [0.041] [0.080] 
1st Wealth  
Quintile 
-0.313 -0.311 -0.312 -0.312 
[0.071]*** [0.068]*** [0.071]*** [0.071]*** 
2nd Wealth  
Quintile 
-0.233 -0.255 -0.233 -0.231 
[0.065]*** [0.062]*** [0.065]*** [0.065]*** 
3rd Wealth 
Quintile 
-0.185 -0.18 -0.186 -0.184 
[0.062]*** [0.060]*** [0.062]*** [0.062]*** 
4th Wealth  
Quintile 
-0.19 -0.184 -0.190 -0.186 
[0.055]*** [0.053]*** [0.055]*** [0.055]*** 
Partner's  
Age 
0.003 0.007 0.003 0.003 
[0.004] [0.003]* [0.004] [0.004] 
Partner's Years of 
Education 
0.028 0.025 0.027 0.028 
[0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Infant   0.904     
  [0.061]***     
Observations 5169 5169 5169 5169 
R-squared 0.11 0.18 0.11 0.11 
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Table 4 Fixed Effects Results  
Height to Age Z-Score Base Model Fixed Effects Model 
Participates in Decisions re. 
Child Health Care 
0.014 0.318 
[0.046] [0.203]* 
Participates in Decisions re. 
Large Purchases 
0.118 0.029 
[0.043]*** [0.223] 
Participates in Decisions re. 
Daily Needs 
0.067 0.076 
[0.045] [0.192] 
Female Child -0.077 -0.014 [0.034]** [0.070] 
Mother's Age -0.009 -0.100 [0.007] [0.027]*** 
Mother's Years of 
Education 
0.073 0.029 
[0.020]*** [0.083] 
Educ*Age  
Interaction 
-0.002 0.001 
[0.001]** [0.003] 
Mother's BMI 0.039 0.106 [0.006]*** [0.023]*** 
Mother in Microfinance -0.101 -0.108 [0.039]** [0.237] 
Mother Working 0.025 0.202 [0.040] [0.292] 
Female Head  
of Household 
0.039 (dropped) 
[0.064]   
Rural -0.063 (dropped) [0.041]   
1st Wealth  
Quintile 
-0.313 (dropped) 
[0.071]***   
2nd Wealth  
Quintile 
-0.233 (dropped) 
[0.065]***   
3rd Wealth 
Quintile 
-0.185 (dropped) 
[0.062]***   
4th Wealth  
Quintile 
-0.19 (dropped) 
[0.055]***   
Father's  
Age 
0.003 0.01 
[0.004] [0.014] 
Father's Years of 
Education 
0.028 0.007 
[0.005]*** [0.023] 
Observations 5169 5169 
Number of Groups   4145 
R-squared 0.11 0.11  
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